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INTRODUCTION 
During the summer of 2006, a newspaper article in the Boston Globe 
precipitated a major debate over President George W. Bush’s use of signing 
statements to register his objections to statutory provisions he was signing 
into law.1 The ensuing controversy prompted hearings before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee,2 the appointment of an American Bar Association 
(ABA) Special Task Force,3 the ABA’s adoption of a recommendation 
opposing the use of signing statements to disregard any laws,4 and a new wave 
of scholarly commentary.5 
 
1 See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A.1 
(claiming that Bush’s signing statements had invalidated more than 750 laws). The Globe later clarified 
that Bush had objected to 750 provisions contained in about 125 bills. For the Record, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 4, 2006, at A.2. 
2 See The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“This issue 
has come into sharp focus as a result of the extensive use by President Bush of signing statements.”). 
3 See TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS & THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS DOCTRINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT 5 (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/publishing/abanews/1273179616signstatereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ76-Z9MK] [hereinafter 
TASK FORCE] (“[I]t was the number and nature of the current President’s signing statements which 
generated the formation of this Task Force . . . .”). 
4 See HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AM. BAR ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION 1 (2006), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/20060823144113.au
thcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKR9-QFSQ] (opposing the use of signing statements to “claim[] 
. . . authority or stat[e] the intention to disregard or decline to enforce all or part of a law”). 
5 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006); Charlie Savage, Symposium, Introduction: The Last Word? 
The Constitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2007); 
Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 597 (2006). 
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This allegedly new form of presidential discretion was regarded by many 
observers as effectively giving Presidents the unilateral power to invalidate 
statutory provisions that they dislike.6 Interestingly, the conclusion of the 
Bush Administration did not end the controversy. Despite Barack Obama’s 
denunciation of the practice as a Senator and as a candidate for President,7 
his continued use of signing statements has drawn its share of criticism,8 
including by the reporter who leveled the original complaint at President 
Bush.9 Although Obama has issued fewer signing statements,10 he has used 
 
6 See TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 22 (condemning the use of signing statements to invalidate 
particular statutory provisions); see also Mark N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing 
Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 363, 366 (1987) (referring to the modern use of signing statements as “an overt attempt to 
usurp power reserved for the Legislature and the Judiciary"); William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of 
Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 714 (1991) (arguing that Presidents may 
use signing statements to control the resolution of “unresolved,” politically “contentious” issues). 
7 See Obama 2008: Bush Used Signing Statements to “Accumulate More Power,” REALCLEARPOLITICS 
(Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2011/04/18/obama_2008_bush_used_signing_
statements_to_accumulate_more_power.html [https://perma.cc/Y23L-P5U2] (quoting then-Senator 
Obama as stating that he disagreed with Bush’s “whole theory . . . that he can make laws as he goes along”). 
8 See, e.g., News Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, Signing Statements Contrary to Separation of Powers, 
Says ABA (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2013/08/
signing_statementsc.html [https://perma.cc/XEM7-TLA7] (reporting that a letter had been sent by 
the President of the ABA to President Obama expressing the ABA’s view that President Obama 
should issue a veto instead of a signing statement when he disagrees with a law). 
9 See Charlie Savage, Obama’s Embrace of Bush Tactic Criticized by Lawmakers From Both Parties, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at A16 (“Mr. Obama’s willingness to use [signing statements] has 
disappointed some who had hoped he would roll back the practice, not entrench it.”); see also Chris 
Edelson, Opinion, Obama’s Swap for Bergdahl: A Presidential Power Play?, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-edelson-obama-bergdahl-executive-power-20140606-
story.html [https://perma.cc/NS2A-8DWL] (arguing that Obama’s use of signing statements is 
contrary to his campaign promises); Humberto Sanchez, Obama Warned on Signing Statements, 
CONGRESS DAILY PM, July 21, 2009, available at GALE Business Insights: Essentials, Doc. No. 
A204094943 (describing a letter from four Democratic representatives to Obama warning him about 
his use of signing statements); Karen Tumulty, Obama Circumvents Laws with ‘Signing Statements,’ a Tool 
He Promised to Use Lightly, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-
circumvents-laws-with-signing-statements-a-tool-he-promised-to-use-lightly/2014/06/02/9d76d46a-ea73-
11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html [https://perma.cc/34A3-9DRF] (noting that Obama has issued close 
to thirty signing statements). 
10 According to The American Presidency Project, President Obama had issued thirty-three 
signing statements as of the end of 2014. See John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, Presidential Signing 
Statements: Hoover–Obama, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/signing
statements.php [https://perma.cc/U4CL-592Y] (listing the signing statements issued by President 
Obama for each year, from 2009 to 2014). 
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them in a manner quite similar to that of the previous Administration,11 and his 
less frequent use of them does not undercut his support for them in principle.12 
This Article offers a new perspective on Presidents’ use of signing 
statements. Following the dichotomy reflected in the literature, I will analyze 
signing statements raising constitutional objections and those offering 
interpretive guidance for ambiguous provisions separately.13 With respect to 
constitutional interpretation of statutes by the executive branch, Presidents 
have long asserted the authority and obligation to consider constitutionality 
when executing statutes.14 The widespread acceptance of the President’s 
power to construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems and to refuse to 
defend the constitutionality of or to enforce statutes in appropriate cases 
confirms the propriety of this conclusion.15 If these fairly uncontroversial 
forms of executive review are permissible, the arguments against signing 
statements amount to nothing more than objections to the form in which 
constitutional review is exercised. Indeed, when the objections are 
constitutional in nature, the signing statement does little work itself, as it is 
the Constitution itself rather than the signing statement that invalidates the 
statute, and there are clear benefits to announcing the constitutional 
interpretation that will be applied to the statute at the time of enactment. 
With respect to interpretive signing statements, I argue that the Supreme 
Court’s precedents regarding the process for enacting statutes laid out in 
Article I, Section 7, give rise to an equal dignity principle that regards the 
President as an essential participant in the legislative process whose views as 
to the proper interpretation of a statute merit the same treatment as the views 
of congressional committees or individual legislators. This principle is 
agnostic about the debate over the propriety of considering legislative history 
when construing statutes. It simply argues that both presidential and 
congressional legislative history be treated the same. Thus, one can ignore 
 
11 See Jeffrey Crouch et al., The Law: President Obama’s Signing Statements and the Expansion of 
Executive Power, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 883, 885 (2013) (arguing that while President Obama 
vowed to “break” from Bush’s manner of using signing statements, Obama has exercised the power 
to issue signing statements in much the same way). 
12 See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
13 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 5, at 313-14, 334, 344-45 (dividing signing statements into 
two types: constitutional signing statements, “in which the president raises constitutional concerns 
about bills,” and interpretive signing statements, in which the President offers an interpretation of 
a statute); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1189, 1191 n.2 (2006) (drawing a similar distinction). 
14 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 167 (2008) (describing how constitutional 
concerns led President Jefferson to terminate prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition Acts). 
15 See, e.g., 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 232, 
242-43 (1992) (describing how President Jefferson’s constitutional objections led him to refuse to 
defend the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland). 
2016] Presidential Signing Statements 1805 
both forms of legislative history without violating the equal dignity principle. 
Conversely, courts that choose to give interpretive weight to legislative 
history generated by congressional deliberations should give the same weight 
to signing statements. 
The practice of relying on signing statements as guides to interpret 
statutes also draws support from a number of policy considerations. These 
include the key role that Presidents play in advancing major legislation, the 
different institutional capabilities and informational advantages of the 
executive branch, as well as the need to conserve enforcement resources. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I offers a brief review of the history 
of signing statements. Part II examines the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
signing statements as legislative history. Part III discusses the institutional 
considerations that provide normative support for giving weight to signing 
statements. Part IV reviews the policy arguments that support giving signing 
statements interpretive weight. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SIGNING STATEMENTS 
Despite the intensity of the attention that signing statements have 
generated recently, signing statements are in fact an old institution. Prior 
scholars have already traced the history of signing statements,16 so I will only 
sketch the highlights here. 
A. Presidential Practices 
Most commentators credit James Monroe with issuing the first signing 
statement when he objected to a law directing how he should appoint military 
officials.17 A more prominent early example is Andrew Jackson’s objection to 
 
16 See, e.g., TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33667, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 1-13 (2012), https://www.fas
.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf [https://perma.cc/76GX-SE47] (detailing Presidents’ historical use of 
signing statements); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND 
THE PRESIDENT 134-41 (4th ed. 1997) (same); CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE 
OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 101-18 (1998) (same); 
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 
1993), reprinted at 48 ARK. L. REV. 333 app. at 342-46 (1995) (same); see also Christopher S. Kelley, 
The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement 57-68 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio), https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession
=miami1057716977&disposition=attachment [https://perma.cc/DF9A-2L92] (same). 
17 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 86 (describing Monroe’s statement). Interestingly, 
one noted scholar has suggested that Thomas Jefferson may have initiated the practice when he 
issued a press release immediately following the passage of the Embargo Acts, in which Jefferson 
limited his own statutory discretion. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration 
and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1685-86 & n.216 (2007) 
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a provision in an 1830 appropriations bill stating that he would not honor 
Congress’s desire that the road in the Michigan Territory extend all the way 
to Chicago.18 John Tyler issued a signing statement indicating his disapproval 
of certain provisions in a political apportionment bill.19 This provoked a 
rebuke from the Speaker of the House, John Quincy Adams, who advised that 
the extraneous document should be ignored as “a defacement of the public 
records and archives.”20 
The next round of prominent signing statements arose during the Civil 
War and Reconstruction.21 For example, Andrew Johnson issued a signing 
statement objecting to a statute that prevented him from removing Ulysses 
Grant as General of the Army, required that Grant’s headquarters remain in 
Washington, D.C., and required that all orders be issued through Grant.22 
When Grant became President, he also issued signing statements declaring 
that he would not use federal appropriations to improve rivers and harbors 
that were purely local, not national, and objecting to an appropriations rider 
purporting to forbid him from closing certain consulates.23 
Presidents have used signing statements more frequently during the 
modern era. For example, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter routinely issued 
signing statements protesting the use of legislative vetoes24 and other 
infringements on the President’s power.25 Although some commentators 
regard Ronald Reagan as having escalated the use of signing statements, he 
in fact issued fewer signing statements than either Lyndon Johnson or Bill 
Clinton.26 George W. Bush is similarly criticized for escalating the use of 
signing statements; however, a closer inspection reveals that he issued fewer 
signing statements than his near predecessors.27 Although he did issue a 
 
(noting that by “sharply limiting the scope of a recently passed statute,” Jefferson may have in fact 
issued the first signing statement). 
18 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 104 (describing Jackson’s issuance of the signing 
statement and ultimate victory on the issue). 
19 See id. at 138 (discussing Tyler’s signing statement and the political backlash it provoked). 
20 Id. (citation omitted). 
21 See id. at 177 (noting how President Johnson used signing statements to register his 
disapproval over sections of the Army Appropriations Act). 
22 See id. (detailing Johnson’s objections to this statute). 
23 See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger to Bernard N. Nussbaum, supra note 16, at 343 
(describing the signing statements issued by President Grant). 
24 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 361, 368-70 (describing the signing statements 
issued by Ford and Carter, respectively). 
25 See MAY, supra note 16, at 110-15 (describing other uses of signing statements by Ford and Carter). 
26 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 5, at 323 tbl.1 (reporting that Reagan issued 250 signing 
statements while Clinton issued 381); Kelley, supra note 16, at app. 3.1 (listing Reagan’s signing statements 
as totaling 276, compared to Johnson’s 302 and Clinton’s 391). But see MAY, supra note 16, at 74 tbl.5.1 
(placing Reagan’s count at 247, Johnson’s at 171, and Clinton’s at 166). 
27 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 5, at 323 tbl.1 (listing Bush’s signing statements as totaling 
132 and placing Clinton at 381). 
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higher number of signing statements that raised constitutional challenges to 
statutory provisions, commentators have concluded that the frequency with 
which he issued such statements was “still not outside the historical norm.”28 
In any event, modern complaints about the frequency with which recent 
Presidents have used signing statements are reminiscent of criticisms leveled at 
John Tyler for using the veto power more aggressively than had his 
predecessors.29 The conventional wisdom is that even if more frequent use of the 
veto is important politically, as a matter of constitutional law, so long as the 
exercise of the veto power is proper, it remains unproblematic no matter how 
many times it is exercised.30 So too with signing statements.31 Conversely, if the 
use of signing statements is unconstitutional, the practice would be problematic 
even if exercised only once.32 Thus, the fact that President Obama has employed 
signing statements more sparingly than preceding Administrations does not 
necessarily render his use of the practice any less problematic. 
It also bears mentioning that the frequency with which Presidents issue 
signing statements is determined in part by Congress. For example, a 
Congress that decides to include a large number of legislative vetoes in the 
legislation it passes may engender a large number of signing statements in 
response. In this situation, however, Congress would be the institution 
responsible for the increase in the use of signing statements, not the President. 
B. Judicial Recognition of Signing Statements 
Since 1899, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized 
signing statements as a proper means for the President to “inform Congress 
by message of his approval of bills, so that the fact may be recorded.”33 But, 
in La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. Unites States, the Court stopped short of 
 
28 Id. at 324. 
29 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 136 (discussing the Whig Party’s criticism of Tyler). 
30 See, e.g., WILFRED E. BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 118-20 (1962); ROBERT J. 
SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 59 (1988) (recognizing that by 1889, arguments that 
Presidents should exercise the veto only under extraordinary circumstances had become 
anachronistic and that Presidents’ power to veto a bill for any reason had become essentially 
unquestioned); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
HISTORY 1829–1861, at 30-33 (1954); Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the 
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 411 (recognizing that “the President is 
unrestrained in his ability to veto . . . bills”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 265 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch] (recognizing that the veto power is “generally agreed to be plenary” and that “it 
has become well-settled that the President has essentially unbridled discretion” in exercising it). 
31 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 5, at 311 (noting that “the relevant question is not how many 
documents are issued, but the content of the documents”). 
32 Id. (same). 
33 La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 454 (1899). 
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relying on signing statements as a guide to statutory interpretation.34 Later 
decisions, including some of the Supreme Court’s most important opinions on 
structural government, accorded signing statements some degree of interpretive 
weight.35 
Commentators have questioned how much significance to place on the 
Court’s reliance on signing statements.36 It is clear that some lower courts 
regard these decisions as endorsing the use of signing statements as guides to 
statutory interpretation.37 Other commentators have suggested that courts 
have been more reticent and “have rarely relied on signing statements and 
have ruled on neither their constitutionality (as executive interpretations that 
directly contradict legislative mandates) nor the amount of judicial deference 
they should receive.”38 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNING STATEMENTS 
Most of the controversy surrounding signing statements has arisen from 
their use to indicate a President’s intention not to enforce a law because of 
doubts as to its constitutionality. Critics claim that the use of signing 
statements to register constitutional objections places Presidents in a position 
to impose their view of the Constitution’s meaning unilaterally.39 
Misgivings about Presidents’ willingness to advance their own 
constructions of the Constitution appear to be overstated. As this Part details, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the Take Care Clause and the Oath 
Clause obligate Presidents to ensure that all enforcement actions comply with 
the Constitution’s mandates. Moreover, well-accepted doctrines, such as 
construing statutes to avoid constitutional problems and refusing to defend or 
 
34 See id. at 459-63 (construing the Act of 1892 independent of a signing statement). 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (referring to statutory 
interpretation offered in a presidential signing statement); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.1 
(1986) (same); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983) (same); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for 
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 424 (1996) (relying on a gubernatorial signing statement to construe 
a state statute); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 296 (1981) (deferring to post-enactment presidential 
interpretations of the Passport Act); Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 
(1974) (deferring to presidential interpretations of the War Powers Act included in executive orders). 
36 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 5, at 345 (“It is not clear at this point . . . whether and to 
what extent courts will give weight to these statements . . . .”). 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 584 n.24 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting the Lopez 
Court’s use of President Bush’s signing statement as a guide to statutory interpretation in order to 
justify the Third Circuit’s following of the same practice); see also United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 
337, 347 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing President Clinton’s signing statement); United States v. 
Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing a signing statement issued by President Bush); United 
States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 262, 268 (11th Cir. 1994) (relying on President Bush’s signing statement to 
support the court’s analysis). 
38 Note, supra note 5, at 600. 
39 See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 23-24. 
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enforce constitutionally problematic statutes, concede the propriety of the 
President engaging in such review. More fundamentally, criticisms of signing 
statements confuse the substance of the action with the form in which it is 
announced. If a statute is unconstitutional, it is the Constitution itself that strikes 
it down. The signing statement has no independent legal effect and is simply a 
different means through which Presidents express their constitutional judgment. 
A. The Propriety of Executive Assessments of the Constitutionality of Statutes 
Presidents’ authority and obligation to make their own assessments 
about constitutionality derive from several sources. These include the text 
of the Constitution, the reasoning underlying the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the judiciary’s power to assess constitutionality in Marbury 
v. Madison,40 as well as the longstanding support for three-branch 
interpretation of constitutional provisions. 
1. Textual Foundations and the Logic of Marbury 
A strong textual foundation underlies Presidents’ authority and obligation 
to make their own assessment of the constitutionality of statutes. As an initial 
matter, the Constitution requires that Presidents swear an oath to “preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.”41 Marbury v. 
Madison invoked the fact that both judges and members of Congress swear an 
oath to uphold the Constitution as a basis for both groups’ power to judge 
the constitutionality of statutes.42 The same reasoning would appear to apply 
with equal force to the Executive.43 
In addition, Article II, Section 3, of the Constitution places Presidents 
under the duty to “take Care that the laws be faithfully executed.”44 This 
clause has been susceptible to two interpretations.45 First, some argue that 
 
40 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
42 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (noting the importance of the application of the oath 
requirement to both judges and the legislature). 
43 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 
507, 523 (2012) (arguing that the Oath Clause “forbids the executive from executing unconstitutional 
[laws]”); Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The All-Purpose Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1835, 1856 (2016) (arguing that “reading ‘Laws’ in the Take Care Clause to refer only to statutes [and 
not the Constitution] would create a structural oddity” given Article II’s Oath Clause, which 
“requires the President to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution’”); Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, supra note 30, at 257-61 (arguing that the Oath Clause places an obligation on all 
three branches of government to interpret the Constitution and imposes a particularly strong 
obligation on Presidents). 
44 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
45 See Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 
1756 (2016) (“The text of the Faithful Execution Clause frames two aspects of the debate over the 
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the Take Care Clause obligates Presidents to enforce every statute to the best 
of their ability.46 Second, others argue that because the Constitution supersedes 
any statute that is inconsistent with it, the Take Care Clause authorizes and 
obligates Presidents to judge the constitutionality of statutes for themselves.47 
In addition, the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. 
Madison48 to justify recognizing the courts’ authority to review the 
constitutionality of statutes confirms the propriety of according the executive 
branch the same privilege. Marbury recognized that courts bore the 
responsibility for resolving cases by applying the law to the underlying facts.49 
Moreover, “[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule,” including resolving any conflicts between 
two sets of law.50 Because any statute that contradicts the Constitution is void, 
determining what the law is necessarily requires the ability to determine 
whether a statute is consistent with the Constitution.51 
All of the rationales that Marbury used to support judicial review apply 
with equal force to the executive branch. Like courts, the Executive routinely 
 
scope of enforcement discretion. . . . [One which is] ‘discretion-granting’ . . . [and the other which 
is] ‘discretion-limiting.’” (internal citation omitted)); Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 43, at 1836 
(stating that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause “as a source of vast presidential power” 
but also as “a sharp limitation on the powers of both the President and the other branches of 
government”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1192-96 
(2012) (describing two diametrically opposed interpretations of the Take Care Clause). 
46 See, e.g., Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. REV. 381, 382 (1986) (“[O]nce 
a bill has passed through all the constitutional forms of enactment and has become a law . . . the President 
has no option under article II but to enforce the measure faithfully.”); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement 
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 693 (2014) (stating that the Take Care Clause “by its 
terms imposes a law-enforcement duty” on the President); see also Kendall v. United States ex rel. 
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (rejecting the argument that “the obligation imposed on the 
President to see the laws faithfully executed [] implies a power to forbid their execution”). 
47 See, e.g., Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. 
O.L.C. 199, 200 (1994) (noting that while the President must “act in accordance with the law,” when 
the law conflicts with the Constitution, the President must use “his independent judgment”); Steven 
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 
620-21 & n.349 (1994) (discussing the President’s ability to resist the enforcement of “a federal law 
that he believes violates his constitutional authority”); Devins & Prakash, supra note 43, at 532 
(arguing that the President is not obligated “to enforce unconstitutional laws or make faithless 
arguments in their defense”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
905, 919-20 (1989) (arguing that the Take Care Clause obligates Presidents not to enforce statutes 
that conflict with the Constitution); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard 
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1631-33 (2008) [hereinafter Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to 
Disregard] (debunking arguments that the Take Care Clause requires Presidents to enforce statutes 
they believe to be unconstitutional). 
48 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
49 See id. at 170-71 (discussing factual situations where executive discretion must be exercised). 
50 Id. at 177. 
51 See id. at 177-79 (declaring that the Court must examine the Constitution in order to resolve 
conflicts between the Constitution and other laws). 
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applies the law to the facts of particular cases,52 a task that inevitably requires 
the Executive to determine what the law is. Because this inevitably requires 
the obligation to assess the constitutionality of a statute, the Executive must 
possess that power for the same reasons that the courts must.53 Although 
Marbury ringingly declared “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is,” the Court also recognized that 
“[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule.”54 This applies with equal weight to the executive branch. 
2. The Tradition of Three-Branch Interpretation/Departmentalism 
The longstanding tradition known as departmentalism, or coordinate 
construction, embraces constitutional interpretation as a task for all three 
branches of government.55 Presidents have long asserted the authority to draw 
their own conclusions about the constitutionality of statutes, including in some 
of the most celebrated moments in history.56 For example, Thomas Jefferson 
terminated prosecutions under the Sedition Act because he believed the statute 
to be unconstitutional.57 Andrew Jackson vetoed the recharter of the Second Bank 
of the United States based on his belief that it was unconstitutional 
notwithstanding the Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.58 Abraham 
Lincoln similarly based his rejection of Dred Scott on his authority to draw his 
own conclusions about the proper interpretation of the Constitution.59 
 
52 See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 30, at 243 (“All instances of execution or 
enforcement of the law involve the application of law to facts.”). 
53 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 23-24 (discussing the role all three governmental 
branches play in constitutional interpretation). 
54 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
55 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 23-24 (describing departmentalism and explaining 
how Marbury fits with this theory of interpretation). 
56 See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21-24 (11th ed. 1985) (providing a 
series of historical writings from figures such as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Abraham 
Lincoln taking this position in a variety of contexts); Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 910-11 (discussing 
Abraham Lincoln’s assertion of such authority during his inaugural address); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 88-99 (1993) (discussing Lincoln’s opposition to the Dred Scott decision and 
his subsequent refusal to act in accordance with it). For useful compilations of executive, legislative, 
judicial, and scholarly materials on the subject, see LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL 
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-32 (3d ed. 2001) and WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 195-284 (1st ed. 1986). 
57 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 67 (“Jefferson ordered the district attorney to cease 
any prosecution under the Sedition Act.”). 
58 See id. at 98 (quoting Jackson’s Veto Message of July 10, 1832 as stating, “It is maintained by 
the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled 
by . . . the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I cannot assent.”). 
59 See Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 911 (discussing Abraham Lincoln’s rejection of the Dred 
Scott decision on substantive due process grounds). 
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More recently, presidential nonenforcement was highlighted by Bill 
Clinton’s decision not to enforce an appropriations rider requiring the armed 
forces to discharge all individuals infected with the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) even if they were asymptomatic because he believed it was 
unconstitutional.60 A similar controversy arose when President Obama decided 
not to defend the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).61 
It is for this reason that Thomas Merrill has noted that the power of the 
political branches of government to interpret the Constitution has been 
endorsed by a veritable all-star list of constitutional scholars, including such 
luminaries as Alexander M. Bickel, Edward S. Corwin, Philip P. Kurland, 
Gerald Gunther, Arthur S. Miller, Alan W. Scheflin, Henry P. Monaghan, and 
Herbert Wechsler.62 While congressional enactments bear a strong presumption 
of constitutionality,63 this presumption cannot be conclusive, otherwise Congress 
would be the sole judge of constitutionality. If that were the case, Congress could 
bootstrap itself into justifying its own actions in ways that could disable the 
Constitution from serving as a check on congressional power. 
B. Accepted Forms of Executive Statutory Interpretation in                           
Light of Constitutional Concerns 
In addition, the Executive’s authority to assess the constitutionality of 
statutes is implicitly recognized by a large range of widely accepted doctrines. 
The restraint with which Presidents are expected to exercise this authority 
confirms rather than contradicts the existence of such authority. 
 
60 See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 226, 227 (Feb. 10, 1996) (indicating that Clinton believed the provision to be an 
unconstitutional violation of equal protection and that the Attorney General would decline to defend 
it); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7 (describing the same). 
61 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) (acknowledging that the Obama 
Administration’s refusal to defend the constitutionality of DOMA created “a complication” to 
standing); see also Meltzer, supra note 45, at 1214 (discussing Attorney General Eric Holder’s “letter 
notifying Congress of the administration’s refusal to continue to defend DOMA”); see generally 
Carlos A. Ball, When May a President Refuse to Defend a Statute? The Obama Administration and 
DOMA, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 77, 85-94 (2011) (analyzing when a President should refuse 
to defend a statue in the context of Obama’s decision not to defend DOMA); Parker Rider-Longmaid, 
Comment, Take Care that the Laws Be Faithfully Litigated, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 342-61 (2012) 
(applying a modified framework for presidential nondefense of statutes to President Obama’s 
decision not to defend DOMA). 
62 See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 49 n.26 (1993). For an updated list, see CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 436 n.5. 
63 See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123 (1877) (“Every statute is presumed to be constitutional.”). 
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1. Constitutional Avoidance 
The Supreme Court has long followed the principle that “where an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”64 The executive branch has adopted the same practice. As an 
opinion on signing statements issued by the Clinton Administration’s Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) noted, “[a] signing statement may put forward a ‘saving’ 
construction of the bill, explaining that the President will construe it in a 
certain manner in order to avoid constitutional difficulties.”65 A subsequent 
opinion on the separation of powers similarly concludes that “the Executive, 
like the judiciary, construe[s] statutes so as to avoid constitutional problems.”66 
The doctrine is invoked in multiple signing statements and OLC opinions.67 
The doctrine has been the subject of criticism. Permitting constitutional 
doubt to change the construction of statutes risks creating a penumbral 
Constitution that forces statutes to give way even when they fall short of 
outright constitutional violations.68 In addition, in cases where Congress may 
have wanted to enact legislation that pushes against constitutional limits, 
avoidance may conflict with legislative intent.69 And, most importantly for 
 
64 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988). 
65 The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C. 131, 133 (1993). 
66 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. 
O.L.C. 124, 128-29 n.13 (1996). 
67 See, e.g., Designation of Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 27 Op. 
O.L.C. 121, 125 (2003) (discussing constitutional avoidance and the construction of the Vacancies 
Reform Act); Section 235A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 24 Op. O.L.C. 276, 282 n.10 
(2000) (taking an approach to interpretation that is “consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
admonition to interpret statutes so as to avoid constitutional questions”); Presidential Certification 
Regarding the Provision of Documents to the House of Representatives Under the Mexican Debt 
Disclosure Act of 1995, 20 Op. O.L.C. 253, 265 (1996) (analyzing the issue to “avoid reaching a 
serious constitutional problem”); Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional 
Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 200 (1994) (“Where possible, the President should construe provisions 
to avoid constitutional problems.”); Statement by the President Upon Approval of Bill Amending 
the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 1959 PUB. PAPERS ¶ 171, at 549 (July 24, 1959) (construing 
amendments to the Mutual Security Act of 1954 to avoid “grave” constitutional issues). 
68 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (“The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising 
constitutional questions is . . . to create a judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra’ that has much the 
same prohibitory effect as the judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself.”). 
69 See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 210 (1967) (“It does not seem in any way obvious, 
as a matter of interpretation, that the legislature would prefer a narrow construction which does not 
raise constitutional doubts to a broader one which does raise them.”); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, 
CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 105 (1997) 
(noting that constitutional avoidance interpretations are “likely to be different from what the court 
thinks the legislature intended,” which means that “the court is probably . . . misconstruing the 
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the purposes of this Article, the avoidance inquiry does not actually relieve 
decisionmakers of the burden of assessing the constitutionality of statutes,70 
although it does permit them to address the issue in a less conclusive manner.71 
Other commentators have specifically analyzed assertions of the avoidance 
canon by the executive branch. Trevor Morrison has noted that the justifications 
for judicial application of the avoidance canon are based in values of judicial 
restraint that do not apply to the Executive,72 although he acknowledges that the 
doctrine can be reconstructed as a way to increase enforcement of certain 
constitutional norms.73 Ernest Young draws a similar conclusion.74 
To date, these critiques have yet to displace the avoidance canon, and 
scholarly attempts to analyze its invocation by the executive branch have 
found ways to reconstruct the doctrine. To the extent that the doctrine retains 
vitality, it supports the executive branch’s authority to assess the 
constitutionality of statutes. Indeed, the reconstruction of the executive 
application of the doctrine in terms of enforcing constitutional norms makes 
this all the more apparent. 
 
statute”); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 898 (2001) (“The [constitutional avoidance] canon wrongly assumes that 
Congress legislates without ever intending to approach the limits of the Constitution. And it often 
results in the Court adopting interpretations that the legislative branch could not have foreseen nor 
intended.”); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (1995) (“[I]n interpreting 
statutes so as to avoid ‘unnecessary’ constitutional decisions, the Court frequently interprets a statute 
in ways that its drafters did not anticipate . . . .”) 
70 See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court’s 
Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16 (1996) (discussing 
how courts engage in constitutional adjudication when they invoke the avoidance canon); Schauer, 
supra note 69, at 87 (noting that in cases where “the interpretive preference is supplanted, the 
constitutional question is not avoided at all”); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance 
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000) (“[A] judge who 
construes a statute in such a way as to avoid a constitutional ‘doubt’ is enforcing the Constitution 
itself—nothing more, nothing less.”). 
71 See Young, supra note 70, at 1582 (“To be sure, there is an important difference between 
deciding that a constitutional argument is nontrivial and actually deciding that issue on the merits.”). 
72 See Morrison, supra note 13, at 1198-28 (noting the importance of analyzing the constitutional 
avoidance canon’s “relevance to the executive on its own terms” given that the canon can be thought to 
“serve[] values peculiar to the federal courts and thus . . . has no direct relevance to the executive branch”). 
73 See id. at 1215 (“[A]lthough the constitutional enforcement theory can be conceived as a 
means of implementing indirectly certain constitutional norms . . . .”). 
74 See Young, supra note 70, at 1586-99 (arguing that the avoidance canon reflects a substantive 
commitment to make invasions of constitutional principles more difficult without making them 
impossible). But see H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313, 
1317 (2006) (arguing that executive invocation of the avoidance doctrine favors the expansion of 
presidential power and should be abandoned). 
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2. Refusal to Defend the Constitutionality of a Statute 
The conventional wisdom is that Presidents have a duty to defend the 
constitutionality of statutes. Although some commentators have implied that 
the duty is absolute,75 the Justice Department has recognized that Presidents 
may refuse to defend the constitutionality of statutes under “exceptional 
circumstances,”76 such as when a statute is “transparently invalid”77 or “clearly 
unconstitutional.”78 Even the scholarly commentary that strongly supports 
Presidents’ duty to enforce statutes recognizes that circumstances exist that 
can justify Presidents’ refusals to defend their constitutionality.79 
Although these commentators’ views vary with respect to how much 
latitude Presidents have in refusing to defend the constitutionality of statutes, 
acknowledging the existence of circumstances under which such a refusal is 
justified concedes that Presidents possess the authority to assess the 
constitutionality of statutes. Indeed, the statute requiring the executive branch 
to notify Congress when it opts not to defend the constitutionality of a statute 
implicitly confirms Congress’s acceptance of the validity of the practice.80 
3. Refusal to Enforce a Statute on Constitutional Grounds 
Finally, the Justice Department has long regarded as “uncontroversial” 
that “there are circumstances in which the President may appropriately 
decline to enforce a statute that he views as unconstitutional.”81 Some 
 
75 See Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of 
Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 71-72 (1979) (“[T]he 
Executive should not be allowed to pick and choose from among constitutional provisions and 
judicial interpretations thereof: the article II duty of faithful execution of the laws does not give the 
President any discernible discretion.”). 
76 Constitutionality of Legislation Establishing the Cost Accounting Standards Board, 4B Op. 
O.L.C. 697, 698 (1980). 
77 The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable 
Legislation, 4A Op. O.L.C. 55, 56 n.1 (1980). 
78 Recommendation that the Department of Justice Not Defend the Constitutionality of Certain 
Provisions of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op. O.L.C. 183, 194 (1984). 
79 See, e.g., Gressman, supra note 46, at 384 (noting that “[t]he Executive can refuse to defend 
the constitutionality of a statute when judicial review has been properly instituted”); Aziz Z. Huq, 
Enforcing (but Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1014-16 (2012) (describing 
“enforcement-litigation gaps” where a President will continue to enforce a statute while refusing to 
defend it in court because he believes it to be unconstitutional); Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 
79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1078 n.14 (2001) (supporting the “practice of ‘enforce but decline to defend’”). 
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring the Attorney General to submit a report 
to Congress when any member of the Justice Department adopts a policy of nonenforcement on 
constitutional grounds). 
81 Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 199 (1994). 
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commentators assert that Presidents possess a broad obligation not to enforce 
statutes they believe to be unconstitutional.82 
Even those taking a more restrictive view recognize that Presidents have 
chosen not to enforce laws they believed to be unconstitutional since the 
earliest days of the Republic.83 Consequently, they generally concede that 
nonenforcement is proper under certain circumstances. The easiest case is 
when the statute is flatly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.84 
Perhaps the clearest example of this is Congress’s persistence in enacting 
legislative vetoes despite the Supreme Court’s condemnation of the practice 
in INS v. Chadha.85 The Justice Department takes a slightly more relaxed 
position, permitting nonenforcement in the absence of a clear precedent 
when it is “probable” that the Supreme Court would reach the same 
conclusion.86 Presidents are also generally afforded greater latitude not to 
enforce statutes that encroach on their constitutional powers.87 
Recognizing that it is sometimes proper for Presidents to refuse to enforce 
statutes concedes the Executive’s authority to assess statutes’ constitutionality. 
Variations in the standard that commentators think that Presidents should 
apply in exercising this authority do not undercut the recognition of the 
Presidents’ authority in this regard. 
 
82 See Devins & Prakash, supra note 43, at 509 (arguing “[t]here simply is no duty to defend 
federal statutes the President believes are unconstitutional”); Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, 
supra note 30, at 276 (concluding that “[t]he President has independent constitutional power to 
decline to enforce laws that are contrary to the higher law of the Constitution”); Prakash, The 
Executive’s Duty to Disregard, supra note 47, at 1616 (asserting that “the Constitution actually requires 
the President to disregard unconstitutional statutes”). 
83 See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal 
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 977-79 (1994) (outlining instances from 1789 to 1981 
where Presidents have objected to allegedly unconstitutional laws). 
84 See Johnsen, supra note 60, at 46 (“The least constitutionally troubling circumstance for non-
enforcement is presented when a provision is clearly unconstitutional as a matter of both executive 
and judicial interpretation . . . .”). 
85 See 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto); see also Louis Fisher, The 
Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 286-88 (describing 
Congress’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the decision in Chadha). 
86 See 18 Op. O.L.C. at 200; accord May, supra note 83, at 990-96 (concluding that Presidents may 
refuse to enforce clearly unconstitutional laws so long as they exhaust legislative avenues for redress, 
defiance represents the sole route to judicial review, and they ensure that judicial review occurs); see 
also Johnsen, supra note 60, at 47 (recognizing that non-enforcement is proper even “when the courts 
have not addressed a question, but its proper resolution is so clear that there can be no genuine dispute”). 
87 See 18 Op. O.L.C. at 201 (“The President has enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional 
provisions that encroach upon the constitutional powers of the Presidency.”); Johnsen, supra note 60, 
at 27 (stating that “the President, no less than the courts, possesses the implicit constitutional 
authority and responsibility to interpret the Constitution in carrying out his assigned functions”). 
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Some commentators argue that the proper course is for Presidents to 
veto legislation they deem to be unconstitutional.88 Constitutional concerns 
may arise with respect to statutes signed into law by a prior administration. 
If so, the current President would not have the opportunity to veto 
questionable legislation.89 Indeed, even if the same President signed the 
statute, as the OLC noted, “there is no constitutional analogue to the 
principles of waiver and estoppel.”90 
In addition, those taking a functionalist approach to separation of powers 
must acknowledge that the constitutionality of a statute cannot conclusively 
be determined at any particular moment in time. Instead, it can only be 
assessed in light of the current conditions, as well as any subsequent 
reallocations of power. Under these circumstances, it is quite feasible that a 
statute that seemed constitutional at the time of enactment may later be seen 
to pose more significant constitutional concerns. 
But perhaps the best argument against requiring Presidents to veto all 
legislation they believe to be unconstitutional is practicality. In an era where 
large, complex appropriations bills are the norm, using the veto as the sole 
means for registering constitutional objections seems wholly unworkable.91 
Consider for example Congress’s continuing propensity for enacting 
legislative vetoes. Presidents would have to veto a large number of statutes, 
which in turn would deadlock the government. A classic example of this 
dilemma arose when President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Lend–Lease 
Act because of its critical importance to the war effort, despite the fact that it 
 
88 See, e.g., The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
supra note 2, at 24-25 (statement of Bruce Fein, Partner, Fein & Fein LLC) (emphasizing that it is 
the President’s duty to veto a bill he believes to be unconstitutional); TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 
20 (noting that “[t]he Constitution . . . limits the President’s role in the lawmaking process to the 
recommendation of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks unwise”); Saikrishna 
Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 81 (2007) 
(arguing that it is the President’s duty to veto bills he believes are unconstitutional). 
89 See Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Domestic War, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 92, 94 (2006), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-domestic-war [https://perma.cc/B25G-AVUF] (“The veto is 
a wholly inadequate substitute for executive review because Presidents would be forced to execute 
unconstitutional laws enacted under prior administrations.”). 
90 18 Op. O.L.C. at 202; accord Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 917 (observing that “[t]o insist 
that the President’s signature on a bill compels him to enforce the law is to say that with the stroke 
of a pen a President may eliminate constitutional objections” and that “[n]o one may consent to 
violate the Constitution, or bind his successor to do so”). 
91 See id. at 202-03 (stating that the President is not limited to either a veto or a full execution 
of a large bill like the Defense Appropriations Act, but instead that he has “authority to sign 
legislation containing desirable elements while refusing to execute a constitutionally defective 
provision”); Bradley & Posner, supra note 5, at 341 (“[T]he argument that a president must always 
veto a bill if it has what he believes to be an unconstitutional provision is unrealistic in an age of 
omnibus legislation . . . .”). 
1818 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 1801 
contained a legislative veto that he believed to be unconstitutional.92 Rather 
than veto the legislation, President Roosevelt chose to register his objections 
in a presidential legal opinion that he lodged with the Attorney General.93 
President Bill Clinton faced a similar predicament when presented with 
legislation requiring the discharge of military personnel who were HIV 
positive.94 Constitutional concerns over the provision had already prompted 
Clinton to veto a prior version of the legislation once.95 But, when presented 
with a similar bill containing the constitutionally objectionable provision—but 
that also appropriated billions in military funding—the military’s need for the 
funds appropriated by the legislation led Clinton to sign the bill.96 Under these 
circumstances, permitting Presidents to sign legislation while registering their 
constitutional concerns may well be more conducive to good government. 
C. Constitutional Signing Statements as Form, Not Function 
Acceptance of the avoidance doctrine and the right of Presidents not to 
defend the constitutionality of or to enforce statutes implicitly recognizes that 
Presidents possess the authority to assess the constitutionality of statutes. This 
power would exist regardless of whether Presidents state their beliefs in a 
signing statement or not. As Curtis Bradley and Eric Posner have recognized, 
Presidents possess numerous mechanisms aside from signing statements for 
allocating enforcement resources and directing subordinates’ execution of the 
law.97 If Presidents may properly refuse to enforce statutes they judge to be 
unconstitutional, the fact that they choose to announce their intention not to 
enforce it in a signing statement seems unproblematic.98 Quite the contrary, 
signing statements “promote dialogue and accountability” by providing public 
information about the President’s views.99 To the extent that the statute is not 
enforced, it is the result of the Constitution, not the signing statement.100 
In other words, many critics of the use of signing statements to register 
constitutional reservations implicitly base their arguments on the premise 
 
92 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 26, 289. 
93 Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV., 1353, 1357-59 (1953). 
94 See Johnsen, supra note 60, at 55 (discussing the statute and Clinton’s predicament). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 5, at 310, 339 (discussing other means at the President’s 
disposal, including issuing a simple memorandum to subordinates). 
98 See id. at 339 (stating that “it is unlikely that a constitutional signing statement changes the 
outcome that would result if the bill were instead returned to Congress and then reenacted over the 
president’s veto”). 
99 See id. at 310. 
100 See id. at 338 (arguing that in a signing statement, “the president is not purporting to use 
his presidential authority to block” a bill, but rather “is claiming that the Constitution itself blocks 
the law from taking effect”). 
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that it is the signing statement that is nullifying the statute when it is actually 
the Constitution itself that is doing the work. Signing statements only pertain 
to the form of the announcement, not the substance. To the extent that 
relying on signing statement promotes accountability, prohibiting the use of 
signing statements is likely to work against the interests of good government 
rather than in favor of them. 
III. INTERPRETIVE SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE                              
EQUAL DIGNITY PRINCIPLE 
As the Supreme Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, the Framers rejected 
the “hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another” 
envisioned by Montesquieu in favor of a system of checks and balances.101 The 
shared powers over legislation is defined by Article I, Section 7, Clause 2: 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the 
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with 
his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter 
the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after 
such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it 
shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall 
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall 
become a Law. . . . If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten 
Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same 
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by 
their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.102 
The Court has noted that under this provision, “[t]he President is a 
participant in the law-making process.”103 Justice Frankfurter has similarly 
commented that statutes are “the product of both Houses of Congress and 
the President.”104 Indeed, the two principal modern decisions interpreting this 
clause support according the President the same dignity in the law-making 
process as the two Houses of Congress.105 
In advancing the equal dignity principle, I need not take sides in the 
ongoing debate about the propriety of consulting legislative history when 
 
101 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). 
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
103 424 U.S. at 121. 
104 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324-25 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
105 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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determining the meaning of statutes. Indeed, critics have leveled a forceful 
attack on the validity of legislative history as a guide to statutory meaning.106 
To say that the President’s views as to the meaning of a statute must be 
accorded equal dignity as Congress’s is not to say that legislative history must 
be accorded any weight at all. Instead, the co-equal status of the branches in 
the lawmaking process simply requires that to the extent that congressional 
views are taken into account, presidential views must be given the same 
consideration. Thus, one could disregard all forms of legislative history 
without violating the equal dignity principle. 
A. Doctrinal Foundations of the Equal Dignity Principle 
1. INS v. Chadha and the Legislative Veto 
The Court offered its most extensive discussion of the constitutional 
provision establishing the process for enacting legislation when invalidating 
the legislative veto (that is, lawmaking without the President’s participation) 
in INS v. Chadha.107 The Court described the provision as the “single, finely 
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” for enacting legislation.108 
Specifically, the same statutory language must be approved by both Houses 
of Congress (known as the “bicameralism” requirement) and submitted to the 
President (known as the “presentment” requirement).109 The Constitution 
provides that Presidents may either sign the legislation into law, veto it, or 
permit it to become law without their signature, unless Congress adjourns 
during that period, in which case the bill does not become law.110 Presidential 
vetoes may, of course, be overridden by a two-thirds majority of both Houses.111 
The Constitution thus assigns essential roles in the legislative process to 
both Congress and the President. Except in the case of a congressional 
override of a presidential veto, a bill cannot become law without the mutual 
assent of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President. The 
Court noted that Presidents play an essential role in this process, concluding 
 
106 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 29-37 (1997) (discussing the dangers of using legislative history in statutory interpretation); 
John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM L. REV. 673, 684-89 (1997) (discussing 
the textualist critique of using legislative history in statutory interpretation); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive 
Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 134-39 (2000) (same). 
107 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
108 Id. at 951. 
109 See id. at 946-51 (outlining these requirements). 
110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
111 Id. 
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that “[i]t is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both 
Houses and the President.”112 
One striking aspect of the Court’s approach is its formalism.113 Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 2, creates an elaborate series of steps, each of which is essential 
to enacting legislation. Under this approach, each step is of equal necessity. It 
does not suggest giving greater authority to one step over the others. 
2. Clinton v. City of New York and the Line-Item Veto 
Chadha did not necessarily signal a jurisprudential revolution in 
interpretive methodology. Although some later separation of powers cases 
followed a formalistic approach,114 others declined to do so.115 At least as far 
as the legislative process is concerned, however, the Supreme Court’s 1998 
decision in Clinton v. City of New York made clear that formalism remained 
the defining approach for interpreting Article I, Section 7, lawmaking process 
when invalidating the line-item veto (that is, lawmaking without Congress’s 
participation).116 The Court adhered to the logic of Chadha, noting any repeal 
of legislation must involve both the President and Congress.117 The Court 
emphasized the importance of strictly following the process established by 
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, noting that it was “the product of the great 
debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself.”118 Although 
the Constitution gives Presidents an affirmative role in the legislative process, 
 
112 462 U.S. at 947. 
113 Indeed, its formalism provides the basis for much of the critique of Chadha. See, e.g., 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 527 (1992) 
(arguing that “Chadha assumes a wooden and unnecessarily formalist operation of bicameralism and 
presentment”); see generally Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the 
Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789 (1983) (criticizing Chadha as overly formal). 
114 See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (finding that congressional 
legislation requiring an Article III court to set aside a judgment violated constitutional separation 
of powers doctrine); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991) (finding an act of Congress to effectively create a veto power over an 
executive agency, thus violating constitutional separation of powers); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 734 (1986) (finding an act of Congress reserving for Congress itself the power to remove an 
executive officer to violate constitutional separation of powers doctrine). 
115 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (finding that sentencing 
guidelines were constitutional and did not violate separation of powers doctrine); Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (finding that the statute authorizing independent counsels did not 
violate separation of powers doctrine); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
858 (1986) (finding that the limited jurisdiction asserted by the Commission did not violate 
separation of powers doctrine). 
116 See 524 U.S. 417, 438-40 (1998) (taking a formalist approach to the interpretation of the 
requirements of Article I). 
117 Id. at 438-39. 
118 Id. at 439. 
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Presidents cannot unilaterally modify legislation.119 Any deviation would not 
be “the product of the finely wrought procedure that the Framers designed.”120 
Together, these decisions embody the proposition that the House, the 
Senate, and the President each constitute essential actors of the lawmaking 
process. Just as Chadha held that legislation requires the participation of the 
President, Clinton v. City of New York made equally clear that legislation also 
requires the participation of Congress. A formal interpretation thus indicates 
that each is a necessary part of the legislative process. The fact that each is 
equally indispensable strongly favors according each a coequal role. 
3. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine 
Both Chadha and Clinton v. City of New York are well known to 
constitutional scholars and lawyers. But another, less well known, line of cases 
exists that is equally probative of the formal approach to legislation. 
The equivalence of the role played by the President and the two Houses of 
Congress is also reflected in a legal principle known as the “enrolled bill 
doctrine,” which has been called “the operative proposition of Article I, Section 
7, Clause 2.”121 After a bill is passed by both Houses of Congress, it is signed by 
both the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate in open session, 
at which point it is called an enrolled bill and is presented to the President. 
In the seminal case of Field v. Clark, the petitioner attempted to use the 
official journals maintained by the House and the Senate to show that a 
section of the bill passed by Congress failed to be included in the enrolled bill 
that was presented to the President for his signature.122 The petitioner 
claimed that because the language approved by Congress differed from the 
language signed by the President, the statute did not comply with Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 2, and thus was not properly considered a valid statute.123 
The Supreme Court declined to consider any evidence of what Congress 
actually enacted outside of the enrolled bill itself, holding that any bill bearing 
the signatures of the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, and 
 
119 See id. at 438-40 (stating that the President “may initiate and influence legislative proposals” 
but also outlining the Court’s reasoning for interpreting constitutional silence on unilateral action 
by the President as “equivalent to an express prohibition”). 
120 Id. at 440 (internal quotations omitted). 
121 Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 74 (2004). For an insightful 
analysis of the enrolled bill doctrine, see Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence 
Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1172-81 (2003). 
122 143 U.S. 649, 668-69 (1892). 
123 Id. 
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the President of the United States and forwarded to the public archives is 
“conclusive evidence” of the statute’s validity.124 
The enrolled bill doctrine thus represents the operational reality of the 
legislative process in action. In the same manner as Chadha and Clinton v. City of 
New York, the doctrine adopts a formal approach to the lawmaking process. This 
formalism provides further support for treating each House of Congress and the 
President as coequal actors in the legislative process. Each must approve the 
language contained in the enrolled bill for proposed legislation to become a law. 
B. The Implications of the Equal Dignity Principle 
Treating all three actors specified in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, with 
equal dignity requires giving equal weight to their pronouncements of the 
meaning of a statute. The fact that Presidents are essential actors in the 
legislative process provides strong reason to give as much weight to their views 
of the meaning of a statute as to the views of the House or the Senate. Equal 
dignity does not require that legislative history receive any consideration. 
Indeed, the equal dignity principle does not take sides in the debate over the 
propriety of relying on legislative history when construing statutes. Equal 
dignity simply requires that presidentially created legislative history be given 
the same weight as congressionally created legislative history. A court can 
satisfy equal dignity by ignoring both as a guide to statutory interpretation. 
The following thought experiment illustrates this principle nicely. 
Suppose that the Senate were to propose legislation that would require courts 
to give controlling weight to the legislative history that it generated and to 
ignore the legislative history generated by the House of Representatives. 
Suppose further that the House of Representatives lacked the political will 
and support to oppose the provision, that the President signed it into law, and 
that the statute eventually ended up being challenged in court. Would such a 
statute be constitutional? The simple answer is that that the Constitution 
gives the House of Representatives a role in the lawmaking process that is 
coequal with the role given to the Senate.125 As a result, any attempt to 
privilege the views expressed in the Senate’s legislative history over the views 
expressed in the House’s legislative history would represent the same type of 
 
124 Id. at 673; accord id. at 672 (concluding that the signatures of the House Speaker, the 
President of the Senate, and the President constitute authentication of the bill’s validity that is 
“complete and unimpeachable”). 
125 There are limited circumstances in which the Constitution gives the two Houses of 
Congress slightly different roles. For example, the Constitution requires that all revenue bills 
originate in the House. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The Constitution also limits the congressional role 
in the ratification of treaties to the Senate and not the House. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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denigration of one of the three actors essential to the legislative process that 
led the Court to invalidate the legislative and line-item vetoes.126 
The same reasoning would appear to apply to presidential legislative 
history. Because, in the absence of a veto override, the assent of the President 
is as essential a part of the legislative process as the assent of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, President’s understanding of the meaning of 
statutes is entitled to no less respect than the understanding of the House or 
the Senate. Any attempt to privilege the views of one legislative actor over 
another would be unconstitutional. 
Some have suggested that the role played by the President in the 
legislative process is more limited than the role played by the House and the 
Senate, in that the President lacks the power to change legislation and can 
only approve or disapprove it.127 The problem with this argument is that the 
same can be said about the House and the Senate. Neither House of Congress 
has the power to alter a statute without the assent of the other House of 
Congress and the President. Indeed, the situation faced by Presidents when 
presented with bill language with which they disagree is little different from 
the situation confronting the Senate when it is presented with bill language 
passed by the House with which it disagrees. Although the procedural details 
differ, in essence, both the President and the Senate face the same choice of 
either approving or rejecting the proffered language. 
Finally, some critics have offered more pragmatic criticisms of presidential 
legislative history. Some have argued that giving weight to presidential signing 
statements opens the door to political manipulation, allowing Presidents to 
substitute their judgment for those of the other actors in the lawmaking 
process.128 Others have argued that presidential signing statements are not 
generally available to members of Congress or the public at large.129 
These critiques apply with equal force to all forms of legislative history—
including history created by the House and the Senate—and not just to 
legislative history created by the President. Congressional legislative history 
has also been criticized for being relatively unavailable to legislators and to 
 
126 Arguments that Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution bars consideration of presidentially 
created legislative history, for example, TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 20 and Garber and Wimmer, 
supra note 6, at 371-75, fail to recognize that the same arguments apply with equal force to legislative 
history created by congressional committees, conference committees, or individual legislators. 
Consistency requires treating all types of legislative history equally. 
127 See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 18-20; Garber & Wimmer, supra note 6, at 373-74, 377. 
128 See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 6, at 709 (arguing that “many recent efforts to create presidential 
legislative history have been politically manipulative”). 
129 See, e.g., id. at 715 (“Legislators might . . . be unaware that legislative history is being created 
and have no opportunity to influence its content.”). 
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the public at large.130 Indeed, there are many members of Congress who are 
unaware of the contents of congressionally created legislative history at the time 
that they vote on legislation.131 Furthermore, committee reports and floor 
statements may represent nothing more than the views of a subset of the entire 
legislative body132 (or perhaps even just their staff133) and may well represent 
politically motivated attempts to influence future statutory interpretation in 
directions that may or may not be consistent with the intent of the entire 
Congress.134 Indeed, skepticism about all forms of legislative history has fueled 
a movement in statutory interpretation toward “textualism,” which would 
only give the force of law to sources that have complied with the bicameralism 
and presentment requirements mandated by the Constitution.135 
A debate over the merits of textualism would exceed the scope of this 
Article. For now, it suffices to acknowledge that the criticisms of unavailability, 
nonrepresentativeness, and political motivation that have been leveled at 
presidential legislative history apply with equal force to congressional 
legislative history. Thus, to the extent that the critiques of presidential 
legislative history have bite, they woulfd appear to invalidate all uses of 
legislative history and not just those originating from the White House. 
C. The Inevitability of Executive Statutory Interpretation 
The legitimacy of presidential statutory interpretation is not only implicit in 
the President’s role in the legislative process created by Article I, Section 7. It is 
also inherent in the President’s responsibility to oversee the execution of the law. 
Executive functions require the application of the law to particular facts. 
This necessarily requires agencies to interpret the statutes they are executing. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Bowsher v. Synar, “Interpreting a law enacted 
 
130 Cf. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 527-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the effort 
and resources required to review legislative history before dismissing legislative intent from consideration). 
131 See SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935) (noting that “probably very 
few” members of Congress “know[] what has taken place in committee” when they vote on a bill). 
132 See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing 
that to assume all Congressmen share the same assumptions when they enact laws is dangerous). 
133 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating 
that case references in committee reports are “inserted[] at best by a committee staff member on 
his or her own initiative”). 
134 See Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 43, 44-45 (1988) (noting a situation in which a statement by a single Senator, which was at odds 
with the understanding of the majority of members, was inserted into the congressional record without 
being read on the floor in what was viewed as an attempt to influence future judicial decisions). 
135 For a defense of textualism, published along with critical essays authored by a number of 
distinguished legal scholars, see generally SCALIA, supra note 106. 
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by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 
‘execution’ of the law.”136 
Indeed, courts have long accorded executive views of the meaning of 
statutes special dignity.137 The privileged role that the Executive plays in 
statutory interpretation is manifest in the Supreme Court’s Chevron doctrine. 
Gaps and ambiguities in statutes are the inevitable byproduct of either the 
inability of anyone to anticipate every possible contingency or of a deliberate 
choice to leave certain issues indeterminate in order to achieve sufficient 
consensus to enact the legislation.138 Chevron treats these gaps as implicit 
delegations to executive agencies to offer their own interpretations.139 
Moreover, Chevron requires courts to accord agency interpretations of the 
statutes they administer a special dignity: if the language of the statute is 
ambiguous, courts will not exercise their independent judgment about its 
proper construction and will instead defer to the agency’s interpretation so 
long as it is reasonable.140 Such deference is justified by the fact that these 
agencies are subject to presidential control.141 Even where Chevron does not 
apply, courts may still defer to agency interpretations based on the agency’s 
specialized experience and information.142 
This is not to say that executive discretion over statutory interpretation is 
unfettered. “Where a law is plain and unambiguous, . . . the legislature should 
 
136 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). 
137 See Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947) (noting that 
“construction by the Chief Executive, being both contemporaneous and consistent, is entitled to 
great weight”); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 23 (1891) (observing that the “principle that 
the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government . . . is 
entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, 
is so firmly imbedded in our jurisprudence, that no authorities need be cited to support it”); Surgett 
v. Lapice, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 48, 68 (1850) (deferring to the contemporaneous statutory interpretation 
of an agency, which had been approved by the Secretary of the Treasury and the President). 
138 In one celebrated example, the House and the Senate deliberately left the Tenure of Office 
Act vague as to whether Andrew Johnson could remove the holdover members of Lincoln’s cabinet 
in order to get the statute enacted. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 179-86. The House 
impeached and the Senate acquitted based on their divergent understandings of the meaning of the 
indeterminate language. Id. 
139 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (“If 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to 
the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”). 
140 See id. at 844-45 (outlining this framework). 
141 See id. at 865-66 (noting that “[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, 
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch . . . to make such policy 
choices”). This reasoning rebuts any suggestions that Congress delegated interpretive authority to 
the agencies and not the President. 
142 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (“Chevron did nothing to 
eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its 
form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and information’ available to the 
agency . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 
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be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no 
room is left for construction.”143 Thus, just as “longstanding precedents . . . 
permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous 
statutory text,”144 Chevron deference also applies only when the statute is silent 
or ambiguous.145 That said, Congress is unlikely to be able to shut off all 
avenues for presidential statutory interpretation completely. Although a 
legislature might try to leave no ambiguity by specifying every contingency 
in advance, the inability to anticipate and address every possible contingency 
makes some degree of interpretation inevitable. 
The role of Chief Executive thus permits Presidents to exert considerable 
influence over the manner in which statutes are interpreted. It would thus 
seem to matter little whether Presidents’ views about the proper interpretation 
of a statute are expressed through signing statements or through agency 
interpretations proffered after enactment. Indeed, banning reliance on 
signing statements would only deprive the public of advance notice of the 
Executive’s interpretation of the statute without significantly reducing the 
President’s ability to influence the way the statute is interpreted. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that Chevron permits agency 
interpretations of ambiguous provisions to change over time.146 Indeed, a 
change in the proffered construction of a statute over time is what gave rise 
to the Chevron case in the first place.147 The potential for changes in an 
agency’s interpretation raises the possibility that a subsequent interpretation 
might conflict with the interpretation advanced in a presidential signing 
statement. If the interpretation in a signing statement were to conflict with 
an agency interpretation, which should prevail? 
The relationship between Chevron and legislative history has long been 
recognized to be complicated and unsettled.148 Chevron step one dictates that 
if Congress has directly addressed the issue in question, the agencies are bound 
 
143 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399 (1805). 
144 Bedroc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n.8 (2004). 
145 See 467 U.S. at 842-43 (describing this interpretive framework). 
146 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) 
(“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the 
Chevron framework.”); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (noting that “change 
is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the 
ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency”). 
147 See 467 U.S. at 863-64 (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. 
On the contrary, the agency . . . must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy 
on a continuing basis.”). 
148 See, e.g., Amanda M. Traphagan, Agency Deference After Home Concrete, 14 TEX. TECH. 
ADMIN. L.J. 153, 165 (2012) (noting that “[t]he role of legislative history in Chevron step one . . . 
remains fractured”). 
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by Congress’s resolution, and any contrary interpretation is invalid.149 To the 
extent that legislative history is properly part of the step-one analysis, any clear 
interpretations emerging from that legislative history would be binding on the 
agency.150 If, however, legislative history is part of the reasonableness 
determination undertaken at Chevron step two, it is quite possible that an 
agency’s preferred interpretation might trump the legislative history.151 
Although Chevron itself considered legislative history at step one, subsequent 
Supreme Court cases have not been consistent on this point, and the Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed the issue.152 Indeed, the circuits have divided 
over whether legislative history may be considered at Chevron step one.153 
Fortunately, the equal dignity principle does not require resolution of 
this issue. Whatever the proper role of legislative history in the Chevron 
analysis, the equal dignity principle requires only that signing statements 
be accorded the same treatment as congressionally created legislative history. 
Indeed, to the extent that the content of the signing statement and agency 
interpretive policy are dictated by the same person, the precise distinction may 
make little difference. 
D. Legislative Power Essentialism vs. the Explicit Recognition of the       
President’s Role in the Legislative Process 
One of the primary objections to according interpretive significance to 
signing statements is the claim that legislation is the proper province of 
Congress.154 Interestingly, invocations of what might be called legislative power 
 
149 See 467 U.S. at 842 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter for the 
court . . . .”). 
150 See Bradley Silverman, Statutory Ambiguity in King v. Burwell: Time for a Categorical 
Chevron Rule, 125 YALE L.J. F. 44, 47 (2015) (“Because Chevron is premised on legislative intent, 
courts should be more willing to examine evidence in Chevron analysis . . . . Because Chevron analysis 
itself turns on congressional intent, under this approach agencies would merit no deference when 
that intent is clear in the legislative history.”). 
151 Chevron treated legislative history as only one factor to be considered under step two, along 
with the statutory language and policy. 467 U.S. at 859-66. Since legislative history is only one of 
three desiderata, it clearly does not control the outcome under Chevron step two. 
152 See, e.g., Santiago v. GMAC Mortg. Grp., Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 387 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (observing 
that the Supreme Court has not resolved whether legislative history may be considered at Chevron 
step one); Coke v. Long Island Health Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating 
that “the Supreme Court has issued mixed messages as to whether a court may consider legislative 
history” at Chevron step one), vacated, 546 U.S. 1147 (2006); Carpenter Family Invs., LLC v. 
Comm’r, 136 T.C. 373, 388 (2011) (noting that “[w]hether legislative history should be considered at 
step one of the two-step Chevron analysis” is still “unresolved”). 
153 Compare, Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (permitting analysis of legislative 
history at Chevron step one), with United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(prohibiting analysis of legislative history at Chevron step one). 
154 See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 6, at 709-13 (critiquing “judicial use of presidential legislative 
history” and arguing that “the President is not a legislator”). 
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essentialism parallel criticisms of claims that certain powers are inherently 
executive;155 that the sharpest critics of broad executive power would raise the 
same arguments on behalf of broad legislative power is somewhat ironic. 
In any event, such claims cannot be squared with the text of the 
Constitution. As every civics student knows, the Framers rejected the strict 
separation of powers in favor of a regime of shared powers.156 The legislative 
process embodied in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, represents one of the 
foremost examples of the system of checks and balances that operationalizes 
this commitment. 
Equally importantly, other constitutional provisions explicitly give the 
President an active role in the legislative process beyond Article I, Section 7, 
Clause 2. For example, the Constitution provides that the President “shall 
from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, 
and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge 
necessary and expedient.”157 The first Clause regarding the State of the Union 
has never been cited by the Supreme Court and has only once been 
mentioned by a lower court case in an opinion that has since been vacated.158 
The Recommendation Clause clearly accords Presidents a role in the 
legislative process. Indeed, the use of the word “shall” makes the proposal of 
legislation obligatory,159 a conclusion supported by Madison’s notes from the 
Convention.160 Furthermore, the Constitution also gives Presidents the power 
“on extraordinary Occasions” to “convene both Houses, or either of them, and 
in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of 
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.”161 
And, of course, the Framers rejected a strict separation of powers in favor of 
giving Presidents the power to veto legislation.162 
 
155 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 553-59 (2004) (criticizing the argument that foreign affairs powers 
are inherently executive). 
156 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 9 
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (describing the abandonment of strict separation of 
powers in favor of a system of checks and balances); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT 
TO REAGAN 29 (1990) (same). 
157 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
158 See Alex Hontos, Note, The Executive Reports, We Decide: The Constitutionality of an Executive 
Branch Question and Report Period, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1059 & n.87 (2007) (discussing the 
infrequent citation to this clause and citing the later-vacated case). 
159 See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2081-82 (1989) 
(describing “the recommendation of measures” as a “duty imposed on the President”). 
160 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 405 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) (noting a change from the word “may” to the word “shall” in the Recommendation Clause). 
161 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
162 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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Clearly the fact that Article I, Section 1, vests “[a]ll legislative Powers 
herein granted” to Congress does not mean that legislation is the exclusive 
province of the House and the Senate.163 These explicit acknowledgements of 
the President’s role in the legislative process explains why some 
commentators regard the President as the “legislator-in-chief” as well as the 
commander-in-chief.164 
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF SIGNING STATEMENTS 
Beyond the constitutional arguments, there are policy justifications that 
support paying special attention to Presidents’ views as to the meanings of 
statutes. In particular, Presidents’ leadership role in the legislative process, 
differences in the political constituency that elects Presidents, the executive 
branch’s distinctive institutional competencies in collecting information and 
enacting reforms, and the limited nature of enforcement resources support 
giving the Executive broad authority to decide whether and how a statute 
should be enforced. Indeed, exercises of discretion not to bring an enforcement 
action are generally judicially unreviewable.165 
A. Presidents’ Preeminent Role in the Modern Lawmaking Process 
Giving weight to presidential views about the proper interpretation of 
statutory provisions draws support from the fact that Presidents have 
emerged as the primary catalyst of major legislation. In earlier times, 
Presidents relied on indirect means to influence legislation.166 That said, early 
Presidents were quite active in proposing and promoting legislation since the 
beginning of George Washington’s first term.167 By the late twentieth century, 
Presidents had become the driving force behind the legislative process.168 
 
163 Id. art. I, § 1. 
164 See generally Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (arguing that “the President’s constitutional role” is “the Legislator-in-Chief”). 
165 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (noting that the “presumption is that judicial 
review is not available” for “[r]efusals to take enforcement steps”). 
166 See FRANK J. GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 121 
(William F. Willoughby ed., 1916) (stating that “the failure openly to give to the President 
constitutional powers by the exercise of which he can influence the passage of legislation . . . has 
naturally led to the development of somewhat secret and indirect . . . methods”). 
167 See CORWIN, supra note 156, at 17 (noting that the first two Presidents “directed the 
legislative process to a notable extent”). 
168 See ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 10 (1983) (stating that “[t]he 
legislature is not the dominant influence in the legislative process” and that “[t]he President is more 
influential”); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND 
JOHNSON YEARS 489 (1968) (noting that “the major legislative impulses of the 1961-66 period came 
from a single source—the White House”). 
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This shift justifies paying attention to Presidents’ views on the meaning 
of legislation. Indeed, the Court has recognized that to the extent the 
President is one of a bill’s primary proponents, the reasons usually given for 
giving greater weight to the views of a bill’s sponsors and floor managers169 
would also support giving greater weight to the President’s views.170 
B. Different Constituencies/Institutional Considerations 
Part of the genius of our Constitution is the decision to design the various 
institutions of government in a way that reflects different constituencies and 
different capabilities. The Great Compromise established the House of 
Representatives to reflect the interests of the large states by determining that 
in the future its membership would be apportioned by population.171 It was 
also designed to have “an immediate dependence on, and an intimate 
sympathy with, the people,” by virtue of the direct popular election of its 
membership to two-year terms.172 The Senate was designed to represent the 
interests of the small states, being constituted so that each state would have 
equal representation.173 It was also designed to check the “mischievous effects 
of a mutable government,” which flowed inevitably from “a rapid succession 
of new members,” by having a higher minimum age requirement and by 
having its members initially selected by State Legislatures for six-year terms, 
in the hopes of making the body more mature and deliberative.174 
 
169 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63 (1980) (“Inasmuch as Senator Long was 
the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his statements are entitled to weight.”); Fed. Energy 
Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) (concluding that “a statement of one of the 
legislation’s sponsors . . . deserves to be accorded substantial weight”); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert 
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951) ( “It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of 
the statutory words is in doubt”). But see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) (“The 
remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.”); 
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 858 n.36 (1976) (declining to give controlling weight to the 
statements of a sponsor and floor manager when the statement was self-contradictory and inconsistent 
with the Committee Report). 
170 See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 12 n.13 (1948) (noting that courts are especially apt 
to defer to an executive interpretation of a statute when “the agency has actively sponsored the 
particular provisions which it interprets”); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 
(1940) (noting that an executive agency’s “interpretation gains much persuasiveness from the fact 
that it was [the agency] which suggested the provisions’ enactment to Congress”). 
171 See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
57, 105-07 (1913) (discussing the interests of large states, the Great Compromise, and proportional 
membership in the House of Representatives). 
172 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
173 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 377 (probably James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(discussing this design of the Senate). 
174 Id. at 380. 
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The Presidency, for its part, was designed to reflect national interests.175 
The strong single leader was also necessary to create an Executive that would 
be more proactive and energetic than the plural Executive established by the 
Articles of Confederation and that would counterbalance a Congress designed 
to be more reactive and deliberative.176 The hope was that the resulting 
combination would “combin[e] the requisite stability and energy in 
government with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican 
form.”177 Because the President is accountable to a different constituency than 
either House of Congress, recognizing presidential signing statements as a 
form of legislative history promises to allow the process of statutory 
interpretation to gain the benefit of a national perspective.178 
C. Informational Advantages 
In addition to representing a different constituency, Presidents enjoy 
some informational advantages in proposing legislation.179 The size of the 
federal bureaucracy and its concomitant ability to employ experts in specific 
fields may make it better suited to gathering the information needed to 
support the development of legislation.180 Presidents may also be better 
situated to preserve confidentiality.181 Indeed, the Opinions Clause and the 
State of the Union Clause arguably places Presidents under the obligation to 
gather and disseminate information relevant to the lawmaking process.182 
 
175 See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. 
REV. 23, 58-70 (1995) (discussing why the President is uniquely situated to serve as a representative 
of the national interest); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2334-35 
(2001) (discussing the importance of the President’s “national constituency”). 
176 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(drawing the connection between the unitary nature of the Presidency and energy). 
177 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 226 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
178 See Sidak, supra note 159, at 2090 (asserting that “the President is better able than members 
of Congress to suppress the desire to appease the parochial interests of any one regional constituency”). 
179 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1630-47 
(2016) (illustrating the vast amount of information available to the Executive through a case study of 
a proposed bill). For early statements, see 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 412-13, § 1555 (1833), stating, “From the nature and duties 
of the executive department, he must possess more extensive sources of information . . . than can 
belong to Congress” and 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, pt. 1, app. 344 
(1803), stating, “As from the nature of the executive office it possesses more immediately the sources, 
and means of information than the other departments of government . . . .” 
180 See MAASS, supra note 168, at 10 (arguing that “the Executive, with its massive professional 
establishment, is better able to provide [information and expertise] than is the legislature”). 
181 See Sidak, supra note 159, at 2087 (suggesting that the President might be better suited than 
Congress to gather sensitive information). 
182 See id. at 2086-87 (discussing the “President’s information-gathering responsibilities . . . 
under the Constitution”). 
2016] Presidential Signing Statements 1833 
D. The Limitations of Plural Bodies in Enacting Major Reforms 
The plural structure of Congress may make it poorly suited to proposing 
certain types of bold reforms. Groups are always prone to collective action 
problems that can inhibit their vitality.183 While perhaps better at striking 
compromises that accommodate disparate points of view, legislative bodies 
are less likely to lead dramatic changes in direction. 
The hierarchical nature of the executive branch may make it better suited 
to coordinate complex legislative proposals and to maintain the discipline to 
see them through the process.184 The unitary nature of the executive branch 
may also give it the accountability and energy needed to push through 
significant legislative reform.185 
E. Conservation of Resources 
Finally, accepting presidential signing statements as a form of legislative 
history can help conserve valuable legislative resources and reinforce the 
democratic process. Suppose that a statute was susceptible to two 
interpretations—one of which would render the statute constitutional, while 
the other might render the statute unconstitutional. It has long been accepted 
that courts faced with such a situation should adopt the interpretation that 
avoids constitutional doubts.186 This rule minimizes the need for courts to 
render constitutional opinions that would only serve to heighten tensions 
among the various branches of government. Many presidential signing 
statements arise in the same posture and adopt the same approach. As noted 
earlier, when faced with a legislative proposal that might or might not be 
construed in a constitutional manner, Presidents often issue signing 
statements noting the potential constitutional problem and stating their 
intention to construe the statute to avoid it.187 
A similar situation arises at a somewhat lower level when Presidents are 
confronted with ambiguous bill language—one interpretation of which would 
be acceptable and the other interpretation of which would prompt a veto. It 
would seem to me that permitting the President to clarify the ambiguity 
 
183 For the classic analysis, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1982). 
184 See MAASS, supra note 168, at 10 (discussing reasons for the Executive to have leadership over 
the legislative process). 
185 See supra notes 176–177 and accompanying text. 
186 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of 
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a 
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” (quoting Crowell 
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))). 
187 See supra Section II.B.1. 
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would be better both for private parties affected by the legislation and for 
Congress. If unable to clarify the ambiguity, Presidents may have no choice 
but to send the legislation back to Congress despite the fact that both 
Houses may well concur with the President’s interpretation. To the extent that 
Congress disagrees with the President’s interpretation, presidential legislative 
history reinforces the democratic process by providing a clearer and more 
prompt platform from which Congress can offer a clarifying amendment.188 
CONCLUSION 
Together these arguments suggest that the use of presidential signing 
statements as legislative history is both inherent in the system of checks and 
balances created by our Constitution and may well enhance democracy by 
promoting better interaction among the branches. It also reflects the reality of 
the key role that Presidents play in advancing major legislation, the different 
institutional and information gathering capabilities of the executive branch, and 
the need to conserve resources. Those who disagree must come to grips with 
the fact that INS v. Chadha and Clinton v. City of New York both treat Congress 
and the President as indispensable actors in the legislative process. 
Embracing presidential signing statements as having the same status as 
congressionally created legislative history does not require endorsement of 
the use of legislative history in general. The equal dignity principle simply 
recognizes the President’s coequal role in the legislative process and in 
constitutional interpretation. A categorical decision to ignore all forms of 
legislative history regardless of source would be as consonant with the equal 
dignity principle as given all forms the same weight. 
 
 
188 Cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court should give words their ordinary meaning to provide “Congress a sure means by which it may 
work the people’s will”); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (noting that “it does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage 
through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover an 
alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is more comfortable”); United States 
v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (echoing these sentiments). 
